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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE GRAND JURY CONCEPT
SEYMOUR GELBER
The author, a 1953 graduate of the University of Miami Law School, is an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of Florida. For ten years he was Administrative Assistant to the State Attorney of
Dade County (Miami), Florida, where he served as counsel to the grand juries of that county. Mr.
Gelber received a Master's Degree in Science (Criminology) in 1968 from The Florida State University,
where he presently is further pursuing graduate work.
This article examines several modern expansions of the traditional Grand jury procedure, particu-
larly the use of Special Grand juries and Special Counsel. These relatively little-used innovations
provide means for bypassing the local prosecutor, which may be necessary for effective investigation
of government corruption. The author concludes his survey of increased Grand jury flexibility with
the observation that Grand jury efficiency may be generally increased through use of Special Grand
Juries and Special Counsel, and the caveat that even an optimum Grand Jury cannot be expected to
assume the functions which properly are entrusted to the police and prosecution.
Many changes have been made in the operation
of the Grand Jury since its common law ancestor
came to this country via English colonists. To-
day, the accusatorial and inquisitorial roles of
the Grand jury have been both expanded and
diffused by such new concepts as the Michigan
one man judicial Grand Jury, Ombudsmen,
Special Grand juries, and Special Counsel.
The Michigan approach with authority cen-
tered completely in the judicial officer has been
under constant attack since its inception in
1917.1 Only in Connecticut has it ever had a
counterpart, and there it was abolished in 1959.2
The Ombudsman, a foreign import possessing
both the glamour of distance and some success as
a repository for citizens' complaints, is still in
the evaluation stage. The use of Special Grand
juries and experimentation with Special Counsel
are the most noticeable alterations. Their develop-
ment is traceable in part to the desire to rid the
Grand jury of the influence exercised by the prose-
cutor, the court and any other governmental
agency which may hamper its free movement.
Special Grand Juries may bypass the local
prosecutor and are generally impaneled through
the Attorney General or Governor for the specific
purpose of investigating corruption in govern-
ment. The appointment of Special Counsel also
replaces the local prosecutor, but by vesting his
authority in the Attorney General, the County
1See SciGLANO, ON MAN GRAND JunY (Gov't
Research Bureau, Mich. State Univ. 1957).
2CoNN. GEN. STAT. Ch. 51, §§111 & 126 (repealed
1959).
Attorney or a member of the Bar, it does not
require the impaneling of a separate Grand Jury.
While Special Grand Juries have found some
acceptance, there has been only a cautious response
to the installing of Special Counsel in place of
the historic advisory role filled by the duly elected
prosecutor. In Dade County (Miami) Florida,
under provisions of a Special Act 3 and the coopera-
tion of the State Attorney, the ultimate has
been reached. There the Grand jury selects
Special Counsel from among members of the Bar,
and the State Attorney appoints him an Assistant
to lawfully interrogate witnesses before the Grand
Jury and sign indictments. Although nominally
an Assistant State Attorney, he serves at the
desire and direction of each Grand Jury and is
responsive to it rather than to the State Attorney.
The result is a Grand Jury unfettered by any
governmental influence whatsoever.
Whatever the value of the form of Special
Counsel in Dade County, its development into
an independent entity is of significance in relation
to the experience of other jurisdictions. In no
other state is authority to select Special Counsel
to supplant the prosecuting attorney vested
solely in the Jury. The usual remedy is to balance
the prosecutor's influence by placing sipilar
weight in another governmental officer, such as
the Attorney General, the Governor, or the Court.
Some states have directly approached the powers
developed for Special Counsel in Dade County,
3 FLA. LAWS, General Acts, Ch. 57-870, Acts of 1957,
§4: "The grand jury may employ an attorney as
special legal counsel for the grand jury who shall
furnish legal advice and services to the grand jury."
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Florida. However, there appears to be little
experience in terms of court tests to determine
the impact of this system. California's Code of
Criminal Procedure allows the Attorney General
to select Special Counsel at the request of a
Grand Jury4 or when the district attorney is being
investigated.5 Inasmuch as a "true bill" need
only be signed by the foreman in California, this
results in Special Counsel having all the authority
of the District Attorney.' It should be noted
that while the Grand Jury must request Special
Counsel, it is the Attorney General who makes
the selection.
The Nevada statute specifically permits Special
Counsel but appears to confine him to investigative
and legal aid In our newest state, Hawaii, provision
exists for Special Counsel, but his activity is
controlled by the Public Prosecutor.8
The statutes and cases show a determination
to require that stringent controls be exercised
on any outside legal advisors to the Grand Jury.
Only in Dade County, Florida, with the coopera-
tion of the State Attorney, can a Special Counsel
effectively bypass all the duly constituted elected
officials and operate totally free of governmental
influence. While unrestrained authority may lead
to abuse, its course also encourages positive
action. How best can sufficient means be made
available for Grand Juries to overcome the political
and personal restraints inherent in prosecuting
officials? Is the specially appointed advisor out
to "get" indictments with no concern for the
rights of the accused? The answer lies in providing
adequate flexibility so that Juries have options
among the choice of advisors and creating ma-
chinery so that no matter the option, sufficient
recourse to other governmental agencies is had
by an accused. The Florida option is limited to
the Governor sending in a prosecutor from another
Circuit to replace the locally elected advisor.9
This can cause considerable dislocation and be
effective only if used sparingly and for short
term matters. One of the alternatives offered is
the use of Special Grand Juries, emanating from
a state level and usually under authority of the
Governor or the State Attorney General. Local
prosecutors continue to oversee their Grand
4 CA. CoDE CRn. Pnoc. §936.5 Id. §925.Id. §940.
7 NEv. REv. ST. Ch. 172.320(4).8 HAwAx REv. LAWS Ch. 144.72.
9 FrA. STAT. Ch. 27.15.
Juries, but another Grand Jury is superimposed
over acts and conduct which they may more ably
pursue.
The most dramatic recent use of the impaneling
of Special Grand Juries occurred in Massachusetts
in 1964. In that State a statute permits the At-
torney General to impanel a Special Grand Jury
by written request showing public necessitylo
The then Attorney General Edward R. Brooke
used the findings of a crime commission financed
by the State with $564,000 as the investigative
arm of the Special Grand Jury. Over five hundred
indictments were obtained ranging from bribery,
larceny, and perjury, to conflict of interest.
Involved were a former Governor, two former
Speakers of the State House of Representatives,
a large number of legislators, a former supervisor
of the state police, and a number of department
heads in the State government. Many convictions
were obtained and from it rose legislative programs
to counteract corruptive influences in government.
The investigation, indictment and trials ran
through a period of two years and any objective
appraisal would have to commend the efforts
and results of this striking campaign for good
government. Yet there are its detractors. Objec-
tion centered about the indictment and trial of
Foster Furcolo, former Governor of Massachu-
setts, charged with conspiracy to arrange a bribe.
The trial judge directed a verdict of not guilty
and scathing press comments followed."
Former Governor Furcolo, in a statement placed
in the Congressional Record,"2 recommended that
a monitor be appointed by the court who would
be available for advice to the Grand Jury and the
court as to any excesses committed or planned
in the jury room. According to Furcolo, the
monitor would have no authority other than pro-
viding a neutral, impartial observer to offset
abuses or irregularities attempted by the prosecu-
tor.
It is of interest to note that the creation of
Special state Grand Juries aimed at diluting the
local prosecutor's domination is here subject to
similar attack. Who can vouch that a "monitor"
10 MAss. GEN. LAWS Ch. 277-2(A).
n Boston Post Gazette, Oct. 11, 1965: "The fact
that not a scintilla of proof was presented to the trialjury of any form of wrongdoing by Furcolo makes it
impossible to understand why he was indicted."
Lawrence Sunday Sun, Oct. 3, 1965: "As matters
now stand, it looks to us like the attorney general
acted pretty irresponsibly in bringing Furcolo to trial."
2CONG. REc., October 21, (1965) (remarks of
Congressman Edward P. Boland, Mass.).
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could not develop into the same unchecked super-
structure of which Furcolo complains?
California invests considerable power in the
Attorney General who, when he considers it in
the public interest, may convene a Grand Jury
and submit criminal matters to it with the full
authority possessed by the District Attorney.8
He may also demand that a Grand Jury be im-
paneled by those charged with duty to so do in
event one is not in session.' 4 Michigan's unique
approach" allows the Attorney General to call
for a Grand Jury; but with a single judge constitut-
ing the Grand Jury, there is little issue as to the
Prosecuting Attorney or the Attorney General
thwarting the investigation. The Michigan system
has overcome the problem of excess authority in
the prosecutor, but, by placing it in the hands of
a judge, it merely transfers the potential im-
balance.
The State of New York lodges extraordinary
authority in the Governor. In the public interest,
he may call one or more special terms of court
and designate a judge to draw a panel which is
subject to the same provisions of the Grand jury
law as those regularly sitting. 6 This applies only
in New York City and not statewide.
The New York experience can best be told in
recounting the events surrounding Thomas E.
Dewey's legendary war on crime during the 1930's.
Dewey succeeded in indicting and convicting the
vice lords of that day who, by their racket control,
appeared to have exercised unwholesome influence
in the business and political life of the community.
An article in the November-December 1936
publication, The Panel, issued by the Grand
Jury Association of New York County, described
the background conflict leading to the selection
of Dewey as a Special Prosecutor and the use of
a Special Grand Jury.17 Lacking legal power to
18 CAT. CODE Cmm. PRoc. §923.
1Id. §913.
15 MIcH. PUB. AcT No. 276 (1951).
16N. Y. Ju cARY LAW §149.
17 THE PA EL (Publication of the New York Grand
Jury Association, November-December 1936):
"At that time there was much loose talk of a bail-
bond combine, the numbers racket, prostitution,
and of various other rackets spreading throughout
New York City and its environs. These reports
interested the March Grand Jury and an effort
was made to get authentic information. District
Attorney Dodge assigned two men from his office
to assist the Grand Jury, but little was actually
accomplished. The Grand Jury was conscious of
conditions and dissatisfied with this lack of prog-
ress. It saw the job as one that required the virtual
replace the District Attorney, the Governor
"persuaded" him to give full authority to Dewey.
Dewey's success has since been cited by all de-
fenders of the use of the Grand Jury in its extra-
ordinary form.
Since the Dewey days, New York Grand Juries,
special and regular, have unearthed official mis-
conduct and criminal syndicate operation, al-
though none as encompassing or dramatic as
the Dewey action. In addition, New York now
has provision for a Governor's State Commission
of Investigationu which operates independently
of regular law enforcement channels or Grand
Juries.
The use of Special Grand juries emanating
from a state level, via the Governor, Attorney
General, or legislature, reflects an effort to create
a more adequate check and balance on local
grand juries. In some instances, the authority
for such action is implied rather than statutory,
and in several states investigating facilities to
control local crime have been created to bypass
Grand Juries. Despite the impact of Grand Juries,
little study has been made of their functional
uses and development.
CONCLUSION
New procedures in the administration of the
Grand Jury show a direction, if not a trend, toward
obtaining greater flexibility in its operation. The
conservative manner in which the prosecutor has
led this citizens' group has caused observers to
conclude that Grand Juries are not functioning at
maximum efficiency. The advent of syndicated
crime, travelling through county and state lines,
calls for new and dynamic defenses, which re-
sponsibility some regard as peculiarly suited to a
supersession of Mr. Dodge and his staff by a special
prosecutor of outstanding ability, vigor, and pres-
tige, and accordingly called upon the District
Attorney to appoint such a man from a list of six
names selected after mature deliberation with the
acknowledged leaders of the New York Bar. Mr.
Dodge refused. The Grand Jury, feeling that its
usefulness as a Grand Jury had come to an end,
asked to be discharged, and at the same time
petitioned Governor Lehman to appoint a special
prosecutor to succeed Mr. Dodge. Mr. Dewey
was selected, given all the powers of the Dis-
trict Attorney himself, an independent staff of law-
yers, investigators, and accountants to be person-
ally selected by him, and charged to prosecute, with
the aid of an extraordinary Grand Jury impanelled
under justice Philip J. McCook, organized crime,
organized vice, racketeering, and their connection
with politics and the agencies of law enforcement."
18 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS ch. 989, §7051 (1958).
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mobile, aggressive jury. The intricate schemes
involving complex corporate endeavors may re-
quire special techniques also best adapted to
Grand Juries. The massive thrust of violent crime
in the community and the greater awareness of it
in each citizen perhaps portends a need for direct
citizen involvement through a Grand Jury. All of
these call for the creation of a responsive Grand
Jury and the removal of impediments, be they
inertia, ineptness or indifference.
The need for additional sources of Grand Jury
counsel to create a more sensitive balance has been
considered in several states. The precarious rela-
tionship involved in such changes has been met
by vesting selection authority in the Court or
the Attorney General. Lacking this, the result is
a citizen body led by a private attorney exercising
power without responsibility to the electorate or
the accused. The unharnessed Special Counsel
has been likened to the Lone Ranger. An unknown
masked man rides into town on a white horse,
representing virtue. In his own manner, he disposes
of evil and then rides away into the setting sun.
A voice inquires, "Who is that?" The answer is
given in an awestruck tone, "That's the Lone
Ranger." Even virtue in combat with evil demands
an accountability. The system requires controls
rooted in the orderly, regular processes of govern-
ment.
Although not used or suggested as an alternative
to Special Counsel, the Special Grand Jury has
found greater general acceptance. Its need is
determined by an agency of government; the
Court, the Attorney General, or sometimes the
Governor. It responds to the emergency situation
and offers the necessary flexibility. The danger
areas are considerably diminished in that control
is exercised by bodies directly responsible to the
electorate.
Maintaining the Grand Jury system as a vital
part of the community is a significant goal. The
variety of direction that has been taken in Michi-
gan, California, and Connecticut, among others,
bodes well for its future. Only this kind of experi-
mentation will keep it alive and functional. New
approaches are special only in the sense that they
are adjustments to today's needs rather than
perpetuation of yesterday's standards. The basic
realization that must be accepted is the recogni-
tion that a Grand Jury is not a law enforcement
agency. It cannot regularly do what is the function
of police and prosecutor. Fighting organized
crime is the day to day full time duty of profes-
sionally trained law enforcers. A Grand Jury
may temporarily buttress law enforcement and
ferret out the cause of its failings, but it cannot
replace the policing institutions. A thorough
understanding of our total law enforcement
structure, its potential and performance, can
best place the role of the Grand Jury in proper
perspective.
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